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Ratemaking, the dreariest legal expression of the dismal science, is
sexy again. Once upon a time, judicially enforced constitutional restraints
on the setting of public utility rates strengthened the intellectual backbone
of the Lochner era.' Contemporary interest in this doctrine stems from the
imposition of "the duty to interconnect, to lease unbundled network
elements, and to sell services for resale" on incumbent firms in the few
remaining "market segments that have natural monopoly characteristics.
2
The Federal Communications Commission's contribution to this great
legal transformation, its embattled total element long-run incremental cost
rule (TELRIC),3 will in all likelihood be reviewed under some variant of
the confiscatory ratemaking doctrine.4 So controversial is TELRIC that it
has inspired a literature on "deregulatory takings ' and a counter-literature
denying the entire phenomenon.6
On this occasion, I do not wish so much to re-engage this debate as to
entertain the combatants. I therefore offer the following anthem for our
deregulatory age, a ballad "dedicated to the [law] I love."7 Sing along, all
you who debate the notion of deregulatory takings, "And we'll have
memories for company / Long after the songs are sung."'
t Professor of Law and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota
Law School. Gil Grantmore provided helpful comments.
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Low rates could be a taking;' 0
High rates would give the public a raking.'
Your discretion is as broad as the sea.'
2
Hope a better rate for me."
Fair value, Justice Harlan,
Don't confiscate my profits, o darlin'. 4
Southwestern Bell's original cost 5
Leaves robber barons in the frost.'
6
One second, this is a gas case."
Depletion's apace!
Low pricing could hurt the home market.
Rate base talk just misses the target.
Group rates throughout the Basin-
Cut costs and hope production will hasten.'8
That nuclear station isn't useful and used;' 9
How could Hope be so abused?20
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